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Introduction
Flavio Gregori (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia)
In Woody Allen’s film, Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989), the fictional phi-
losopher Louis Levy holds the pessimistic view that events in one’s life 
«unfold so unpredictably, so unfairly, human happiness does not seem to 
have been included in the design of creation»; it is only «we, with our 
capacity to love, that give meaning to the indifferent universe». The ap-
parently hopeful note that «most human beings seem to have the ability to 
keep trying, and even to find joy from simple things like their family, their 
work, and from the hope that future generations might understand more» 
(qtd in Lee 2001, pp. 57-58) is contradicted by the fact that, at the end of 
the film, we know that professor Levy committed suicide, going «out the 
window» (see Fahy 2001, p. 87). Professor Levy’s «Sartrean existential-
ism» (Lee 2001, p. 58) would not be endorsed by most eighteenth-century 
thinkers, writers and divines, at least in England (for France, see e.g. 
Mauzi 1969). The age of the Enlightenment believed that man’s morality 
could be attuned to the harmony of the universe and individual happiness, 
when obtained through a virtuous and ethical life, was synonymous with 
universal happiness. 
Roy Porter, who devotes a chapter to «Happiness» and puts it at the very 
center of his influential book on the British Enlightenment, thinks that the 
Enlightenment’s «great historical watershed lay in the validation of pleas-
ure» (Porter 2000, p. 258). One’s personal, psychological and even bodily 
pleasures became, to use Alexander Pope’s words, «our being’s end and 
aim» (Essay on Man, Epistle IV, ll. 1-2; Mack 1950, p. 128). Pope actually 
did not want to define happiness: he rejected both the principal classical 
versions of happiness, the Stoic and the Epicurean, «Pleasure and Content-
ment» (l. 22; p. 129); he did not fully subscribe to the egotistical explanation 
of happiness, as it does not «subsit […] in the good of one, but all» (l. 38; 
p. 131); he thought that happiness increased in «mutual wants», without 
depending on condition and circumstance, because «Heav’n breaths thro’ 
ev’ry member of the whole / one common blessing, as one common soul» 
(ll. 61-62; p. 134). Pope’s caveat, «Oh sons of earth! Attempt ye still to rise, 
/ By mountains pil’d on mountains, to the skies? / Heav’n still with laughter 
the vain toil surveys, / And buries madmen in the heaps they raise» (ll. 73-
76), reminded his readers that happiness is not easy to obtain and cannot 
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be the outcome of one’s will-to-power, because «Fortune her gifts may 
variously dispose, / And these be happy call’d, unhappy those» (ll. 67-68; 
pp. 134-135). That said, though, Pope agreed with his contemporaries on 
some philosophical and moral grounds of happiness. In the famous discus-
sion of self-love at the end of An Essay on Man, Pope equated individual 
passions with social reason, and, although their relationship is «hopelessly 
murky» (Damrosch 1987, p. 149), that association shows how Pope voiced 
the eighteenth-century locus classicus of sponaneous, natural happiness: 
the natural rights to pursue one’s interest could increase sociability, if 
contained within the bounds of virtue and benevolence. 
As noted above, happiness remained somewhat mysterious to Pope 
(Meyer Spacks 1997, p. 183), because «Fix’d to no spot is Happiness sin-
cere, / ’Tis nowhere to be found, or ev’ry where» (ll. 15-16; Mack 1950, p. 
129). William Warburton, the first posthumous editor of Pope’s collected 
works, believed that Pope’s idea of happiness coincided with that of virtue: 
Conscious Innocence (says the poet) is the only source of internal Peace; 
and known Innocence, of external, therefore, Peace is the sole Issue 
of Virtue; or, in his emphatic words, Peace is all thy own; a conclusive 
observation in his argument, which stands thus: Is Happiness rightly 
placed in Externals? No; for it consists in Health, Peace, and Compe-
tence. Health and Competence are the product of Temperance, and 
Peace of perfect Innocence» (Warburton 1750, p. 92). 
Self-love and sociability, in fact, «are only two different motions of the 
appetite to Good, by which the Author of Nature hath ennabled Man to 
find his own happiness in the happiness of the Whole» (p. 84). The coin-
cidence of happiness and virtue (the desire of moral good) in a ‘conscious 
and known innocence’ is providential: it is guaranteed by the «Author of 
Nature». Warburton proposed a teleological understanding of happiness, 
in which theology, naturalism, empirical psychology, and ethics coincide. 
Warburton’s reference to providential interpretation, however, should not 
obscure the fact that for him, as for most eighteenth-century writers and 
thinkers, the ultimate ground of happiness lies in one’s ‘inside being’, what 
Locke defined as the satisfaction of our desire of pleasure, fear of pain 
and avoidance of uneasiness. Locke united a hedonistic interpretation to 
theological voluntarism (and Pufendorf ’s jus naturale): real happiness is 
«not only what we ought to do morally, but it is also what conduces to our 
greatest happiness, as is evident when we think of the ‘unspeakable’ joys 
and equally terrible pains that God holds out as rewards and punishments» 
(Taylor 1989, p. 171). 
Charles Taylor observes that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, the philosophers 
of moral sentiments, and even most Deists subordinated the reference to 
God «to a conception of happiness which is defined in purely creaturely 
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terms. Happiness is the attaining of things we by nature desire, or pleasure 
or absence of pain» (p. 267). Afterlife’s rewards and punishments are only 
the reflections of this life’s pleasures and pains. 
Thus, also happiness as pure expression of virtue became a secularized 
version of theological thought. Darrin McMahon underlines how the En-
lightenment changed the traditional conception of the happy man «as one 
who approached the gods, who had gone beyond the merely human, who 
had achieved a form of transcendence» (McMahon 2006, pp. 12-13). The 
eighteenth century made happiness into something that can be obtained in 
this life, or in the course of history, through progress: «We may therefore 
acquiesce in the pleasing conclusion that every age of the world has in-
creased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, 
and perhaps the virtue of the human race», Edward Gibbon declared (see 
Nisbet 1994, p. 187). Happiness became «less an idea of godlike perfection 
than a self-evident truth, to be pursued and obtained in the here and now» 
(McMahon 2006, p. 13). Others held an even more extreme view according 
to which the «principle of self-interest» was not only the spring of human 
actions but the main and best incentive to promote and administer a soci-
ety. «This atomization of the public good into disparate interests amounted 
to a privatization of virtue» (Porter 2000, p. 263). 
Various historical changes and events contributed to the transformation 
of happiness from a luxury item for the very few into a larger social and 
political agenda: the growth of urban centres, the birth of a consumer so-
ciety, the emergence of secularized individualism, the financial revolution, 
Locke’s science of the mind, utilitarian ethics, the new political arithmetics 
(forerunner of modern economic science), and the rise of sentimentality 
and sensibility (McMahon 2006, pp. 197-252). Individualism and empiri-
cism shaped the new configuration of happiness: in traditional societies, 
from the Greeks through Christianity, the norms by which man’s actions 
are judged were inscribed within society itself and even when actual social 
life diverged from the norms nonetheless it was ultimately perceived as the 
production of those norms; instead, 
the breakup of the traditional forms of social life which was produced by 
the rise of individualism, begotten partly by Protestantism and capital-
ism, made the reality of social life so divergent from the norms implied 
in the traditional vocabulary that all the links between duty and happi-
ness were gradually broken. The consequence was a redefinition of the 
moral terms. Happiness [was] no longer defined in terms of satisfactions 
which are understood in the light of the criteria governing a form of 
social life; it [was] defined in terms of individual psychology. Since such 
a psychology [did] not yet exist, it ha[d] to be invented. Hence the whole 
apparatus of appetites, passions, inclinations, principles, which is found 
in every eighteenth-century moral philosopher (MacIntyre 1998, p. 107). 
English Literature, 2, 1, 2015, pp. 5-16
8 Gregori. Introduction
ISSN 2420-823X
The utilitarian rule of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, 
introduced by Richard Cumberland (White 2006, p. 129) and Francis 
Hutcheson (Taylor 1989, p. 264) and developed, later in the century, by 
Jeremy Bentham, derived from the psychologization of the ethical, theo-
logical, and socio-political spheres. Happiness became ‘my’ happiness, or, 
in Dr Johnson’s terms, the «multiplicity of agreeable consciousness» (see 
Norton 2012, p. 6). «Happiness consists in the highest and most durable 
Gratifications of, either of all our Desires, or, if all cannot be gratified at 
once, of those which tend to the greatest and most durable Pleasures, 
with exemption either from all Pains and Objects of Aversion, or at least 
from those which are most grievous», wrote Francis Hutcheson (1742, p. 
114). Those divines and thinkers, such as Joseph Butler, who took issue 
with Hutcheson’s ‘complete sentimentalism’ (see Potkay 2000, p. 97) and 
with the moral-sentimental school for transforming ethics into aesthetics, 
and promoted, instead, a rational view of passions and self-love, adopted 
a providential explanation of the coincidence between morality and hap-
piness. Such a coincidence is granted in the after-life, however, not in this 
sublunary world. 
Yet even Butler’s providential justification of the conjunction of duty and 
self-interest is based on, and clashes with, his individualism. According to 
Alasdair MacIntyre, «[Butler’s] theology is pernicious because it enables 
him to bring in the eternal world to redress the balance of duty and inter-
est in the temporal world. The individualism is apparent in his account of 
human nature, which is expressed in terms of the self-awareness of the 
single individual» (MacIntyre 1998, p. 106). In less refined thinkers such 
as Abraham Tucker, adds MacIntyre, God had become almost a deus ex 
machina who bridged the gap between the wordly, corporeal explanation 
of happiness, and other-wordly providentialism: the link between the here-
and-now and future life remained more a petitio principii than a convincing 
explanation. For instance, in The Light of Nature Pursued, Tucker said that 
men naturally follow their instincts and satisfy their desire for pleasure; at 
the same time he maintained that «the basic moral rule is that we should 
all work for the good of all men, to increase the amount of satisfaction in 
the universe, whether it is our own or that of others» (p. 107). Therefore, 
if men work to increase the happiness of all men, God becomes the meta-
physical guarantee that all the benevolence and happiness produced by 
them will be equally divided. It was almost a financial version of theology, 
on which MacIntyre comments: «This happiness God has divided into 
equal shares – equal because our original corruption makes us all equally 
undeserving – to be allotted one per person. I become entitled to my share 
by working to increase the common stock. By so working I increase that 
stock and thus my own share. I am, in fact, a partner in a cosmic joint stock 
enterprise of which God is the unremunerated managing director» (p. 107). 
Separated though they were by their different conceptions of morality, in 
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the end both the moral-sentimentalists and the providentialists shared the 
same quantitative-arithmetic vocabulary (Benjamin Stillingfleet’s satire of 
the ‘mathematical methods’ being the exception to the rule; see McMahon 
2006, pp. 213-214). Both Tucker and Hutcheson believed in a «perfectly 
interlocking universe, which God had designed for the mutual good and 
happiness of its inhabitants» (Taylor 1989, p. 261). On the other hand, not 
only the followers of Descartes, Locke and Hume, but also orthodox Lati-
tudinarians such as John Norris, or John Tillotson, admitted the desire for 
pleasure, including sensory pleasure, which then would lead to the desire 
for God, as an irresistible bias in us that must be seconded and made more 
explicit and clear through will and reason (Mander 2008, pp. 149-159; see 
also Regina Dal Santo’s article in this collection). «Things work together 
for the best», in this optimistic conception of individual and cosmic happi-
ness (Taylor 1989, p. 261). 
However, the picture is not always so bright and uniformly positive. 
According to Vivasvan Soni, the modern devaluation of happiness as a 
«bourgeois complacency» (Fredric Jameson’s phrase, see Soni 2010, p. 3), 
as private self-interest with no regard for community and without a political 
scope, was already contained «in the logic of the eighteenth-century’s own 
discourses». The eighteenth-century rhetoric of a universal, providential 
happiness, in Soni’s view, obscured the fact that it had lost the deeper 
understanding of happiness as was present in the classical Greek concep-
tion, in particular in Solon’s cryptical proverb: «Call no man happy until 
he is dead». The Greek conception, in fact, stressed the fact that happi-
ness is not «a passive emotion, but the practice of living well» (pp. 14-15): 
in other words, not the immediate fulfilment of desires or the acquisition 
of goods, but a life that is led virtuously and happily until its completion, 
and whose true happiness can be judged only from the vantage point of its 
final stages (on the classical ‘making sense of one’s life as a whole’, see 
also Annas 1993, pp. 27-43). The eighteenth century forgot the classical 
conjunction of contingency and wholeness exactly when the discourses 
on happiness were at their height. Soni thinks that the decline of the So-
lonian idea of happiness had happened already in Aristotle’s and Plato’s 
ethical systems (which he calls «the first forgetting»; pp. 17 and 123 ff.); 
however, it was in the eighteenth-century paradigm of the ‘trial narrative’ 
that the modern discourse on happiness supplanted the Solonian idea of 
happiness, by suspending its hermeneutics of contingency and replacing 
it with the test of one’s individual ability to overcome life’s troubles. The 
‘trial narratives’ undermined the full acknowledgement of contingency in 
favour of the individual test’s results. Happiness was no longer a fact of 
one’s complete life, bringing about the Delphic injunction ‘know thyself ’, 
but «a specifically epistemological knowledge, abstracted from everyday 
existence, and only found by subjecting oneself to conditions of suffering 
and hardship» (p. 197). In this transformation of life into problem-solving 
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utilitarianism, happiness became a prize, a reward, even a profit that can 
be calculated. In Soni’s interpretation, the process whereby the hermeneu-
tics of happiness became a ‘trial narrative’ which suspends and negates 
the very hermeneutics from which it was generated, is visible in Richard-
son’s Pamela and Clarissa, in Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield, and in 
many eighteenth-century narratives, especially in the sentimental ones. 
Once the trial narrative intruded into the novel, it generated «the modern 
reified conception of happiness in time after the trial» and impeded the 
return to the classical notion, imposing «its rules on any subsequent nar-
rative of happiness. Thus even when the trial narrative itself has ended, 
no return to a tragic [i.e. Solonian] narrative structure is possible» (p. 18). 
What was finally lost in this sentimentalized replacement of the classical 
idea of happiness with the ‘trial narrative’ is the very utopian ideal that the 
Enlightenment wanted to celebrate and enact in modern society: «driven 
out of narrative, severed from community, emptied of political content, 
happiness [became] an awaited reward in a never-ending time of trial» 
(Norton 2014, p. 359). 
Soni’s interpretation is complex and philosophically profound, and can-
not be adequately summarized and discussed here; it brings to surface the 
dire implications of what McMahon calls the transition from «the happi-
ness of virtue to the virtue of happiness» (McMahon 2004): the reification 
of happiness, the shrinking of the political within the spheres of the eco-
nomical and the individual, the loss of totality and of any ambition to utopia. 
The problem of the reification and mystification of happiness was however 
well-known to some eighteenth-century writers: we have seen how for Pope 
happiness was indeed a slippery concept; Samuel Johnson made the search 
for happiness a theme of his work, yet he imbued it with the difficulty of not 
only grasping the concept but grasping felicity itself, qua the vanity of hu-
man wishes (on Johnson and Hume’s sceptical approach to happiness see 
Potkay 2000, and Freibrug in this collection); Jonathan Swift’s scourging 
satire of all forms of enthusiasm exposed the condition of complacent hap-
piness as a form of madness: «the Possession of being well deceived. The 
Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves» (Walsh 2010, p. 112). 
In his Jonathan Swift: Defeat, Isolation, and the Price of Failed Norms 
in this collection, Howard D. Weinbrot examines Swift’s increasing disen-
chantment with the flimsiness of the norms that rule the individual and 
society. In his life, Swift became ever more hostile «to British culture’s 
growingly benevolent view of mankind», observes Weinbrot; this created 
in him a personal unhappiness towards the violence and dogmatism of 
his cultural and political mileu, a «darkness of vision» that cast a gloomy 
shadow over his affection for his friends and his delight in domestic har-
mony, and made him «almost instinctively [hate and detest] ‘that animal 
called man’». Professor Weinbrot detects the several reasons for «Swift’s 
fear, concern with change, and fury toward those not properly responding 
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to his concern», in the political situation of his time, with a new royal dy-
nasty that threatened to reduce the power of the established Church, and 
upstart politicians who had become powerful and rich to the detriment of 
a virtuous administration; in the recollection of a past made of revolutions, 
upheavals, regicide, dissenting sects; in «the special case of Irish Catholic 
subjection»; in his failed career and removal from England; in his idea of 
original sin and predestination; and in his own poor health. A dominant 
theme in Swift’s works is the «sense of collapse, loss of order, of one man 
who stands in the gap to resist presumed moral barbarism and pays the 
price»: whether he denounced the disappearance of the norms or insisted 
on norms that are under threat, he ultimately regarded humanity as self-
destructive or unable to improve. For Swift, «neither church nor state, 
neither humanity nor a beloved woman, neither epic precedent nor equine 
reason, are enduring and practical models»; and yet, Prof. Weinbrot insists, 
we should not confuse the dark side of Swift’s message with his larger 
desire to draw attention not only to the problems he satirized but also to 
how overcome and solve them: «Excess evokes awareness, which evokes 
attention, which, he again hopes, might check decay. Swift thus does not 
often provide comfort, but does evoke a norm that requires reorientation 
or significant stretching of our own norms». If Swift’s lost battles made 
him an unhappy man, his continual reference to a stability under threat, 
which can exist only in «shared rather than competing human interests in 
human relations», bequeaths us with a glimpse of political optimism and 
allows to think in sober utopian terms, without any concession to a sloppy 
complacency with the present, and with a clearer vision of the future. 
Samuel Johnson perfectly understood Swift’s uneasiness: Rudolph Frei-
burg, in his «The Multiplicity of Agreeable Consciousness»: Samuel John-
son’s Sceptical Philosophy of Terrestrial Happiness, expands on James 
Boswell’s portrait of Dr Johnson as a complex and unhappy character, trou-
bled by various diseases and unbearable bouts of «morbid melancholy» 
that made him wish to «escape from himself». However, Johnson was also 
a good-humoured man, who liked to entertain his friends, spend the nights 
in pub-crawls, and drive through London, a city he associated with life and 
felicity because it provided a «multiplicity of agreeable consciousness». 
Freiburg discusses the special nature of Johnson’s eudaemonism, finding 
its characteristics in the intersection of various doctrines, from Callicles 
to Plato, from Aristotle to the Stoics, the Scholastic tradition, and contem-
porary empiricism. In particular, Johnson believed, as Richard Hooker 
had done, that «Happiness is that estate whereby we attain, so far as pos-
sibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is 
to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort the contentation 
of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection» (Lynch 2002, p. 
232). Johnson’s happiness is an end of human life and is meaningful in 
itself: it must be «imagined as a welcome byproduct of human activities» 
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that can be obtained through a virtuous life. In the end, Johnson’s scepti-
cal approach made him reject a simplistic interpretation of the nature of 
happiness: he adhered to the ‘know thyself ’ dictum, and put the several 
expressions of human, worldly happiness to the test of reason, by destroy-
ing the ‘cobwebs of the mind’ that submerge consciousness in the illusion 
of an ephemeral and vain felicity. Johnson deconstructed several clichés 
of worldly happiness, eventually to endorse only the felicity «beyond the 
grave», the eternal happiness of after-life. 
Regina Dal Santo, in her John Tillotson, Self-love and the Teleology of 
Happiness, explores the ways in which not only sensualists, moral-sen-
timent philosophers, or enlightened eudaemonists, but also divines and 
sermonists adhered to the ‘happiness revolution’ that took place in the 
long eighteenth century. The Latitudinarians promoted a moral reforma-
tion that validated human feelings, desires and ambitions on earth, when 
controlled by reason and leading to a virtuous and charitable behaviour. 
In particular John Tillotson’s ample reference to the egocentric passions 
of self-love and self-interest «show[s] a turning point in the evolution of 
the modern concept of happiness: while asserting the individual right to 
happiness, Tillotson reminds his audience of the possibility of a moderate 
but delightful enjoyment of the world that ultimately correspond to the 
natural fulfilment of self-interest. Tillotson changes the question ‘How can 
I be saved?’ into ‘How can I be saved and happy?’». Righteous improve-
ment in this life thus becomes tantamount to redemption in the after-life, 
in Tillotson’s view, and the consideration of future happiness could leave 
room to a restrained enjoyment of earthly pleasures. Dal Santo underlines 
the pedagogic side of Tillotson’s homiletics, his addressing «the malleable 
nature of Man, the part that can be educated to religion and to the promo-
tion of sincerity and charitable activities». The search for happiness, joined 
with obedience to God’s laws and sincerity of heart, favours the improve-
ment of society’s mores and helps man to obtain his eternal happiness in 
the after-life. However, Tillotson never recommended an unmindful bliss 
in the pleasures of earthly matters or political grandeur; on the contrary, 
Dal Santo remarks, «Tillotson [drew] an interesting parallel between lov-
ing oneself and denying one’s material desires and [concluded] that they 
coincide». The traditional principle of ‘knowing oneself ’ then was central 
in Tillotson’s prudential and providential teleology. 
Brian Michael Norton’s «The Spectator», Aesthetic Experience and 
the Modern Idea of Happiness finds the sources of modern aesthetics in 
eighteenth-century discussions on eudaimonia as «a first-person, typically 
present-tense feeling or affect», and in perceptual metaphors borrowed 
from the language of taste: «We have grown so accustomed to thinking 
about happiness in this way that we may no longer recognize it as meta-
phorical, and indeed it may no longer be metaphorical. In moments of hap-
piness, we really do feel happy; there are times when we really do seem 
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to savor life. Aesthetic-perceptual tropes lurk even in historical accounts 
of how this idea came into being». By focusing on Addison and Steele’s 
Spectator papers, Norton provides an archeological reconstruction of the 
cultural background of modern aesthetics as (also) the principles of human 
happiness. Addison and Steele promoted not only an artistic theory but 
also an art of living «that pursues affective well-being through intensifying 
and enlivening our experiences of the world». By becoming more percep-
tive to the beauties of the world and of life, «we can intensify the feeling 
of living, enhancing the ‘Satisfactions of [our] Being’», and creating the 
condition for us to fully appreciate our position in a cosmic order, because 
aesthetic pleasure is the same pleasure animating the larger world of na-
ture. Through «an affective affirmation of being», Addisonian aesthetic 
pleasure and happiness confirmed a universal, holistic experience of the 
world. 
Kevin L. Cope’s Happy Face or Happy Space? Expansions of Happiness in 
Eighteenth-century Expository Verse explores the similarly widening scope 
of the aesthetic (in this case poetic) experience of happiness not only as 
something that happens within the individual, as something ‘inside’, but al-
so as something happening ‘in space’. In a discussion of eighteenth-century 
poets ranging from Mark Akenside to James Thomson, Thomas Warton, and 
Christopher Smart, Cope explores the association between happiness and 
space, finding out several contradictions in the idea of happiness contained 
in eighteenth-century poetry, between mimesis and praxis: for instance, 
in Thomson, «happiness is procedurally paradoxical. On one hand, it is 
experienced primarily in the long view, from a position so detached that 
very little is happening; on the other hand, that long view must not only 
be of something but must also show that particular occasion of happiness 
interacting with Thomson’s panoramic presentation of the seasons». The 
paradox consists in the fact that happiness mixes activity and inactivity, 
observation and engagement, and is a property in itself and a consequence 
of experience, as happens with the preposition ‘of ’ that is so typical of 
much poetry of the time (e.g. Akenside’s Pleasures ‘of ’ the Imagination): 
«a slightly bewildering preposition, for it suggests connecting both a bond 
and a diverging proceeding». Happiness’s space, in the eighteenth-century 
verse, is a space both lost and regained, and is vast. 
In her article, «Nothing Better than Mirth and Hilarity»: Happiness, Un-
happiness, Jest and Sociability in the Eighteenth Century, Abigail Williams 
perceptively shifts the focus of scholarly attention from philosophy and the 
poetic evocations of the beatus vir to the «culture of mirth, of jestbooks 
and pamphlets designed to create well-being in alternative ways, and in 
particular, to drive away melancholy through communal joviality». Hers 
is an entirely new chapter in the study of the formation of public opinion, 
understood not only and not so much as the political agora of the news-
papers, parties and clubs, but as the shared practice of sociable mirth, 
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a literature of laughter that moved across class and gender boundaries, 
«situated between oral and printed culture, constantly evoking the social 
exchanges that it mimics, and in turn, as jokes and jests and comic poems 
are copied into commonplace books and letters, [moving] back into oral 
circulation». The many publications designed to ‘purge melancholy’ were 
evidence of the eighteenth-century effort to increase sociability, good hu-
mour and an amiable form of communality. However, Williams observes 
how the idea of becoming happy through laughter was far from being a 
simple one: creating a shared ground for mirth was a complicated task, 
as jestbooks and comic poems created a tension between the well-being 
induced by laughter and a sense of alienation in those who were laughed 
at; therefore the search for sociability in merry laughter had to negotiate 
between ‘laughing with’ and ‘laughing at’ the social subjects. Moreover, 
the traditional topos of the idealized contentment of the ‘happy man’ was 
complicated and upset by jovial sociability: looking «at how people read 
and used the literature of jest reveals the faultlines between theories of 
happiness, and the lived reality. We can see the way in which jokes and 
games were sometimes seen as an embodiment of friendship groups, and 
were thus especially valuable for those living in relative isolation – often 
the same kind of rural seclusion that was elsewhere praised as a model of 
contented moderation. It also shows us the way sociable humour promoted 
inclusive ideas of general human well being, but that it was also frequently 
predicated on the exclusion of certain groups». Even in jestbooks the ques-
tions of happiness created more paradoxes than clear-cut social answers. 
Isabelle Bour, in her Happiness and Ideological Reconfiguration in the 
Revolutionary Novels of Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Hays (1788-1799), 
studies the issue of happiness in the end-of-century, revolutionary interpre-
tation given in Mary Wollstonecraft’s and Mary Hays’s novels, where happi-
ness is «defined dialectically in relation to such key concepts and values as 
nature, reason, virtue, the passions and sensibility». Both writers derived 
their ideas of happiness from their reading of fiction, «where the domi-
nant aesthetics and ethics had been for several decades those of sensibil-
ity, the corresponding generic model being the romance». Wollstonecraft 
and Hays set out to challenge the sentimental model rather than endorse 
it, because it was based on the assumption that women are intellectually 
inferior to men and dominated by the passions, therefore they did not give 
much room to happiness in their novels, where the word ‘unhappy’ occurs 
more often than ‘happy’ in connection with their protagonists. On the 
other hand, their redefinition of both sensibility and reason, with regard to 
women, problematized the idea of virtue and made the very structure of the 
sentimental novel explode into a dystopian and formally dysfunctional kind 
of romance that exposed «the many ways in which women are exploited 
by men» and voiced «the misery of the protagonists in the hyperbolic 
style that may be associated with revenge tragedy or Gothic fiction». In 
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Wollstonecraft and Hays, happiness became «gendered, psychologized 
and historicized […] and found to be graspable only through redefinition of 
other values and through a depiction of unhappiness». These two writers 
may be the first example of the nineteenth century’s dislike of happiness; 
however their criticism and dissection of sentimental romance and senti-
mentality positions them among those enlightened thinkers who wanted to 
reconsider men’s and women’s social and cultural status without recourse 
to sentimental rhetorics (on sentimentalism and happiness see Soni 2010, 
p. 290 ff.). 
All together the articles contained in this issue complicate and – we 
hope – make more interesting the questions concerning eighteenth-century 
happiness, its role in modern literature, and its meaning for us; in the hope, 
to quote again Woody Allen’s fictional philosopher, «that future genera-
tions might understand more». 
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